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Structured Abstract
Purpose  – This  paper seeks to contribute  to the literature  on commercial  involvement  in open 
source software, the levels of this involvement and the consequences of attempting to mix various 
logics of action.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses a case study approach based on mixed methods: 
literature reviews and news searches, electronic surveys, qualitative interviews and observations. It 
combines findings from several research projects as well as previous publications to present the 
scope of commercial options within open source software projects and their consequences.
Findings –  Our  findings  show  that  higher  levels  of  involvement  in  open  source  software 
communities  poses important  questions about the balance between economic,  technological  and 
social  logics as well  as about the benefits  of being autonomous,  having access to collaborative 
networks and minimizing risks related to free-riding. There are 6 levels of commercial involvement 
in open source and each of them is characterized by a different dilemma.
Originality/value – The paper sheds light on the various level of business involvement in the open 
source movement and emphasize that the popular ‘open innovation’ concept is only the first step in 
real involvement and paradigm change.
Keywords – commercialization, open source, open innovation, contradictory institutional logics
Paper type - Research paper 
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Introduction
Software development began in the U.S.A. in the 1950s and over the following decades a global  
organizational field emerged: a community of organizations and individuals that subscribes to a 
common meaning system in which participants interact with one another more than with actors 
external to the field (Scott, 1994, pp. 207-208). The field came to consist of a meaning system, 
which  perceived  software  as  a  technical  device.  Participants  saw  it  as  natural  that  software 
development took place within open innovative communities in which professional developers and 
users  shared  knowledge  about  software  products  across  private  and  public  organizational 
boundaries. In the 1970s private companies began to introduce a different meaning system, which 
found it natural to understand software development as a commodity subject to proprietary rights. 
Within  these  two  organizational  fields  or  meaning  systems  different  software  products  were 
developed, and the fields engaged in fierce political debates over how knowledge should be shared 
and money earned within software (Weber, 2004): on the one hand was an organizational field that 
perceived the development  of software within open communities focusing little or not at  all  on 
earnings as natural, and on the other an organizational field that continued to consider it natural to 
commercialize  and patent  software.  In  popular  terms  the two original  fields  may be called  the 
‘copyleft’ and the ‘copyright’ fields (Gehring, 2006). 
Since the middle of the 1990s, companies have begun to get involved in open source software 
communities - combining commercialization and copyleft-modes of innovation (see for example 
Lerner  and Tirole,  2002; Grand  et al.;  2004; Langdon and Hars, 2007; Fosfuri,  Giarratana and 
Luzzi, 2008; Ciesielska, 2010; Westenholz, 2012; Ciesielska and Petersen, 2013). As this leads to 
crossing private and collective models of agency (Ulhøi, 2004), these companies have been facing a 
dilemma: if the company builds a strong relationship with an open source software community, it 
needs to respect the norms in the community, and that may limit its room for maneuvering. On the 
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other hand, the company will get the benefits of support and innovation from the community. If a 
company moves away from the community, it may be easier to make a profit, however it will not 
obtain support and innovation from the community.  The term “open innovation” was coined by 
Chesbrough and extensively described in his publications (2003; 2006; 2011) as only the first step 
in real firm involvement and paradigm shift towards a more open model. The ‘open’ here means 
that there are many ways for ideas to flow into the process and out into the market, for example by 
duplicating incentives, knowledge sharing within the firm or alliances. The path to open innovation 
leads  through  redesigning  business  model  and  very  strong  intellectual  property  management 
(Chesbrough, 2006). The community can both bring external ideas to the company (“outside-in”) 
and take their unused ideas outside (“inside-out”) (Chesbrough, 2006). Another very particular form 
of open innovation is involvement of the (lead) users in enhancing or creating new products and 
services (von Hippel, 1976, 2005; von Hippel et al., 2011). 
Companies have been dealing with the control vs. openness dilemma in different ways. In the paper 
we  develop  a  six-step  graduation  of  business  involvement  in  open  source  software  (OSS) 
communities. We start by reviewing the existing literature on how companies have been dealing 
with  the  “opening  up”  strategy.  We  systematize  the  literature  into  six  degrees  of  business 
involvement  in  OSS.  We  present  our  methods,  then  illustrate  the  three  lower  degrees  of 
involvement  with  secondary  data,  focusing  on  the  three  higher  levels  for  which  we  examine 
longitudinal case studies. In the concluding section we review the empirically observed levels in the 
context  of the existing literature and conclude with a discussion of the key dilemmas faced by 
commercial organizations. 
Literature review
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OSS  is  identified  as  an  increasingly  important  business  model  (Feller  and  Fitzgerald,  2002; 
Bonaccorsi  et al.,  2006).  Lerner and Tirole (2002) described how since the turn of the century 
numerous major corporations, including Hewlett Packard, IBM, and SUN have launched projects to 
develop and use open source software.  Other companies  such as Red Hat  and VA Linux have 
specialized in commercializing Linux, and yet another group of open source software companies 
have  received  venture  capital  financing.  They argue  that  companies  may employ two different 
strategies to deal with the interface between open (copyleft) and closed (copyright) source software 
development: they either imitate some aspects of open source processes, or mix open and closed 
processes. If companies follow the first strategy they do not get involved with open source software 
communities, as they will not allow users to modify their code. But these companies may, to some 
extent,  duplicate  the  incentive  by letting  core  developers  work with both  proprietary and open 
source. They may also imitate the idea of open source code sharing within the company, and/or they 
may involve their customers in the development of their product (Langdon and Hars, 2007). In the 
second strategy, companies become involved with open source software communities in various 
ways.  They  may  choose  a  reactive  relationship  with  open  source  communities  by  allocating 
programmers to an open source software project. Or they may choose a more proactive strategy by 
releasing  code  and  creating  a  governance  structure  for  the  resulting  open  source  process.  For 
example Fosfuri,  Giarratana and Luzzi (2008) discuss how firms are responding to open source 
software  by  adjusting  to,  resisting,  or  supporting  it,  dependent  on  the  stock  of  patents  and 
trademarks that firms have accumulated before commercializing their first OSS product.  
Capra  et al. (2009) substantiate the second strategy defined by Lerner and Tirole in a survey on 
companies’ participation in open source community projects. Capra  et al. argue that a distinction 
should be made between a) open source projects, which are led entirely by a company, and b) open 
source projects, which are led by community members. The researchers are primarily interested in 
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the latter  situation where companies become involved in a community project.  They argue that 
companies  are  profit-oriented agents  and that  the primary goal  is  to  get  tangible  benefits  from 
participation in the open source project. Companies may follow different models of participation in 
open source communities: they may participate in creating codes; they may support the project that 
creates codes in other ways, e.g. they may provide financial and logistical support; and they may 
engage in administrative or managerial work within the project in order to orient the product in a 
competitive way for the company.
Simultaneously,  different  ways  of  combining  business  and  open  source  software  community 
projects  and new business  models  have  been  created  (Krishnamurty,  2005;  Weber,  2004).  For 
example Fitzgerald (2006) makes a distinction between business strategies within OSS 2.0 and Free 
& Open Software (FOSS). OSS allows to view the source code, but not necessarily use it free of 
charge. FOSS development processes are characterized by value-added service-enabling and loss-
leader/market-creating. In the latter strategy the open source product is sold for free, but with the 
end goal of enlarging the market for a closed sourced products and services.  Grand  et al. (2004) 
further investigate the question of how companies engage in the creation of open source software, 
developing a four-level model of companies’ resource allocation. At level 1, companies primarily 
use rather than develop the software. However, this is not completely costless, as companies need 
technological  expertise  for  installation  and  integration  into  the  existing  IT  environment. 
Hoppenbrouwers (2007) mentions that these companies – which he calls ‘community customers’ – 
sometimes become engaged with open source software communities by donating efforts around the 
product  to  the  community.  At  level  2,  companies  like  IBM  and  Sun  Microsystems  sell  their 
products with open source software as a complementary asset. This may require major investment, 
as development may be needed to adapt code developed for other purposes. At level 3, open source 
software becomes a design choice for the way the companies develop specific new software. At 
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level 4, open source software moves from being the design choice for a specific project to the 
design choice for the companies’ overall business model. The researchers argue that the four levels 
have a gift economy logic; the greater the resource investment managers have to make, the greater 
the potential benefits. 
Grand et al.’s (2004) four levels deal with companies’ resource allocation in the creation of open 
source software, going from minimalcosts to a total allocation of resources to open source software 
as  the overall  business model  of  the  companies.  In  this  paper  we focus on the  involvement  of  
companies  with  open  source  software  communities.  The  question  addressed  here  is  how 
relationships between companies and open source communities are created. 
The  literature  on  firms’  involvement  with  open  source  software  communities  shows  great 
variations, which we systemize in figure 1 (Westenholz, 2012, p.28)1. The levels 1-3 were largely 
described in  the literature,  providing various businesses  as  successful  implementations  of  those 
strategies. Here, the authors selected the secondary cases to illustrate the point about lower levels of 
involvement. 
Insert figure 1 
A  good  example  of  the  Level  1  -  “open  innovation” is  General  Electric’s  (GE)  initiative  on 
renewable  energy,  which  was  considered  as  a  new,  neighboring  market  to  the  existing  core 
business, or so-called “adjacency” (Idelchik and Kogan, 2012). As a first step they partnered with 
venture capitalists who support new ventures. After GE announced two investment funds and the 
Ecomagination Challenge they received 4,000 ideas from entrepreneurs in 160 countries. Several of 
those  were  funded  by  GE  directly,  and  those  in  need  of  further  development  before  the 
commercialization stage were supported by a further 20 million USD Innovation Fund. In a second 
1 Copenhagen Business Press kindly agreed to use the figure from the book: The Janus Face of Commercial Software  
Communities – An investigation into institutional (non)work by interacting institutional actors. 
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stage the company developed a network of business scouts to tap innovation networks in Israel,  
Japan, and Russia, India, China, Germany, and the United States. Lastly, they applied a structured 
invention platform to capture the highest value from their ventures, search for the best innovations, 
moderate their risk, and accelerate business growth. In the opinion of the practitioners involved in 
the implementation of those changes in GE, Idelchik and Kogan (2012, p. 31): “tearing down the 
lab walls, so to speak, and collaborating with these new partners has allowed GE to see around the 
corner, spot new technology and business trends, and make informed strategic decisions in growing 
adjacencies.” GE was the primary beneficiary of their investment, as the open collaboration allowed 
an acceleration of the scaling and commercialization of innovations and entrepreneurs helped GE to 
challenge assumptions about business that became institutionalized in a big corporation, while the 
community  around  the  GE  eco-business  supported  them  with  suggestions  and  best  solutions 
(Winston, 2011).
There are also companies, which become  community customers  (Level 2). For many years Open 
Office was a key end-customer OSS product, which was widely adopted in governmental and local 
agencies,  educational institutions and some private sector companies such as hotel chains, retail 
shops, insurance companies, or even big manufacturers (Table 1).
Insert Table 1 here
Most  Open  Office  users  have  migrated  from  proprietary  Microsoft  Office  products,  and  this 
happened for various reasons. For example American Health First Inc 2004 decided to implement 
Open Office because of lack of initial investment, which afforded 2 million dollar in savings, and 
similar reason are given by others (Morgan, 2012; Fitzgerald and Kenny, 2004). Moreover Health 
First  Inc was able to save even further on other licensed products such as Adobe Acrobat and 
macromedia  Flash,  because  of  additional  functionalities  of  Open  Office  in  comparison  to 
Microsoft’s package (Stafford, 2004). However it seems that in a public domain, organizations are 
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also  often  driven  by  democratic  values  such  as  independence  and  self-determination  (Cassell, 
2008). At the same time implementing open source software is not problem-free. Common issues 
are  related  to  unfamiliarity  with  the  software,  potentially  blocked  functionalities  (especially  in 
documents exported from proprietary software), difficult support for proprietary applications and 
finally the potential cost of implementation (Karjalainen, 2010). Therefore once initiated, further 
migration to other open source software packages is likely to happen (Stafford, 2004).
 Level  3  are  companies  which are  mixing proprietary  and Open Source Software  solutions. A 
successful  and  highly  regarded  business  at  this  level  is  Open  Xchange,  Ltd  (http://www.open-
xchange.com/). This company was founded in May 2005 to continue its previous incarnation as part 
of the SUSE Linux Openexchange Server. The founders of the company were involved in a range 
of software projects – both open and closed sourced – until they decided to implement a mixed 
strategy (Brodkin, 2007).  Open Xchange offers a collaboration platform allowing its users to share 
e-mails, calendars, tasks, and documents generated both by proprietary and open source software. 
As an integration tool it allows IT administrators to migrate systems to an open source environment 
as  well  as  to  create  and  implement  applications  without  having  to  change  their  existing 
infrastructure components (Galli, 2005). Before Open Xchange the world of e-mail server software 
had  long been  dominated  by  Microsoft's  Exchange  and IBM's  Domino  packages,  but  that  has 
changed  since  1and1 Internet,  the  world's  largest  Web hosting  company,  decided  to  roll  out  a 
million e-mail accounts running on Open Xchange's open-source software (Hamm, 2007). Today 
the company has acquired a good reputation on the market, receiving highly positive reviews from 
its current customers. From 2006 the project was awarded several times, including the Best Linux 
Groupware Server in the first Enterprise Open Source Readers Choice Awards. Casadesus-Masanell 
and Llanes (2011) speculate that incompatibility between systems makes it more likely that more 
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firms will adopt a mixed-source business model in the future instead of a pure open source business 
model.
In section 4 below, the higher degrees of companies’ involvement in Open Source Software (Levels 
4  to  6)  communities  will  be  illustrated  with  empirical  case  studies,  followed  by an  analytical 
section. But first, we describe our research methods.
Methodological notes
This  paper  is  based  on  a  mixed-methodology,  where  primary  and  secondary  case  studies  are 
compared  to  formulate  a  framework  for  business  involvement  in  open  source  software 
communities.  We  were  primarily  interested  in  the  higher  levels  of  involvement,  which  pose 
additional challenges for the business, and in those cases empirical data was collected. Data about 
the other three cases was sourced from existing publications and re-analyzed. The combination of 
data  sources  was used to  widen the  spectrum of  discussed levels.  This  strategy of  comparison 
between primary and secondary data has not been frequently used before, mostly due to potential 
problem with data interpretation (Gillies and Edwards, 2005). The reason for this is twofold. On the 
one hand, re-use of existing qualitative research for secondary analysis may be limited by a lack of 
fit between the original and secondary data. On the other, lack of access to the original context may 
further impede the analysis (Gillies and Edwards, 2005). 
However,  Hammerslay (2010, p.6) points out that “the fact that data are being re-used does not 
signal the presence of problems that never arise in the context of primary research, nor does it  
automatically imply that ‘fit’ and ‘context’ are going to be impossibly troublesome” although those 
problems may be more likely to occur. Also, accepting the interpretation risks involved, we argue 
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that  the way we recontextualize  the  data  (Moore,  2007) enabled us to develop a more  holistic 
framework. Detailed strategies and methods employed are described below.
Secondary data
The cases  describing  levels  1  to  3 are  based  on secondary data:  literature  and news searches,  
companies’  websites  and interviews with employees  and managers.  The selection  of cases was 
dictated by the clarity of relation between open and closed strategies in their business models. The 
choice of the cases and the accuracy of their description and representativeness were confirmed by 
informal consultations with the Open Source Software developers. 
Primary data
The actual empirical studies were conducted to understand firms’ involvement in Open Source, as 
this  was  identified  as  an  understudied  area.  The  cases  describing  levels  4  to  6  are  based  on 
longitudinal  research  conducted  by  the  authors.  This  was  part  of  a  larger  research  project  on 
Institutional entrepreneurs, but was run as independent investigations of the particular cases. The 
choice of cases was dictated by their accessibility and high level of company’s involvement in the 
open source universe. The cases were brought together at the end of the Institutional Entrepreneurs 
project and re-discussed to reach a closer understanding of what it means for a business to be highly 
involved  in  open  source  and  what  kind  of  consequences  may  be  involved.  This  strategy  also 
resulted  in  the  use  of  variety  of  methods  depending  on  the  access  gained  to  the  particular 
community and company, as well as the specificity and size of the project studied.  For example the 
TYPO3 study was  focused on the  community  of  companies  and contributors,  while  studies  of 
GNOME and Maemo were conducted primarily from Nokia’s point of view. This affected not only 
the varied methods used but also a specific coding sheets used for analysis. As such the cases do not 
claim to be representative  for any industry or sector,  nor to  be extrapolated,  but  provide close 
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accounts of the potential scope of business involvement in open source and how this may affect the 
company itself. 
The  cases  of  Nokia’s  involvement  in  Maemo  and  GNOME are  based  on  a  three-year  project 
involving Open-ended interviews, direct observations and documentary material (Ciesielska, 2010; 
Westenholz et.al., 2012). In total 20 formal interviews were conducted - 10 Nokia employees and 
four subcontractors working on Nokia’s open source and tablet activities, as well as six independent 
open source software contributors. Many informal communications followed and were documented 
in the form of field notes. Interviews were semi-structured (Fontana and Frey, 1994; Kostera, 2007), 
with the preliminary list of questions prepared only to initiate the conversation rather than follow 
them strictly (Spradley, 1979). In addition, unstructured direct observations (Agar, 1980/1996) were 
made on seven separate events – conferences and meetings between 2007-2009, as well as during a 
visit to the Nokia Research centre in Helsinki. Websites and discussion forums concerning Maemo 
and GNOME served as a source of netnographic data (Kozinets 1997; 1998; 2002; Langer and 
Beckmann,  2005)  together  with  existing  publications  and  public  statements  about  Nokia’s 
involvement in OSS documentary material (see Ghosh, 2006; Dittrich, 2007). The analysis of this 
material was constructed around themes of knowledge management, trust development/collapse and 
identity struggle. The detail code sheet can be found in Ciesielska (2010, p. 51-53).
The TYPO3 case illustrating level 6 is based on two electronic surveys, thirteen interviews with 
managers  of  contributing  companies  and one  direct  observation  of  a  community  meeting.  The 
surveys (Marsden and Wright, 2010) were conducted in 2005 and 2006 by the authors of this article 
and two colleagues at the University of Copenhagen, Peter Gundelach and Benedikte Brinker. The 
aims of the surveys were to gain knowledge of the community and how the companies became 
involved with the community. The 2005 survey was carried out electronically (Sheehan 2001) to all 
5.155  members  of  the  community  defined  as  the  participants  on  all  TYPO3 mailing  lists  and 
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newsgroups around the world. 1,675 (32.5 %) of the questionnaires were returned, which is a fairly 
high response rate compared to other e-mail  surveys. The 2006 questionnaire was electronically 
mailed to 1.110 TYPO3 firms listed on TYPO3 homepages. Half of all the companies that have 
been approved as consultancy companies by the TYPO3 Association participated in the survey; 
self-listed companies, however, had a relatively low response rate. Open-ended (Spradley, 1979; 
Fontana  and  Frey,  1994;  Kostera,  2007) and  elite  (Stephens  2007) interviews  were  conducted 
between 2005 and 2008 with the founder of the community and with 13 managers in companies in 
Denmark,  Germany  and  Holland.  We  also  conducted  direct  observation  (Agar,  1980/1996) 
participating in a three-day TYPO3 conference in Germany in 2006, and gathered material from the 
Internet  about  the  community  (Westenholz  et.al.,  2012).  The  analysis  of  this  material  was 
constructed around themes of sharing and not sharing knowledge in relation to the specific practice 
in which companies developed software for specific customers. The detail code sheet can be found 
in Westenholz (2012, p.103 and 110).
Higher levels of involvement
Level 4: Companies creating and leading their own open source software community
The level 4 companies create and manage OSS project to support their business. In recent years, the 
famous, although unsuccessful story, is Nokia with its Maemo community. The Maemo.org domain 
was originally registered in February 2005 by Nokia Corporation and has since then remained in its 
assets. Not coincidentally this launch occurred the same year that Nokia released its N770 device 
and its involvement with many upstream open source software projects. The first hackers’ activities 
on  the  website  are  dated  May  2005.  Although  the  project  websites  state  that  the  “Maemo 
community is a non-profit organization sponsored by Nokia, which is an active and equal member”, 
it was clear that Nokia’s position in it is far more privileged. From the project’s beginning Nokia 
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had an overall control and ability to support only selected developers. Maemo users and developers 
–  if  they  decided  to  collaborate  –  had  to  accept  Nokia’s  dominance  (Ciesielska,  2010;  2012; 
Ciesielska and Iskoujina, 2012). 
In general, Nokia offered very few incentives for developers and it did not enable a payment facility 
for software downloads from Maemo.org by the end users. The biggest problem with Maemo.org 
applications  was that  very few of them were ever  fully completed  to  be released  for  the mass 
market. As a result the website’s community remained truly engaged – albeit at a hobbyist level, not 
a  professional  level.  Maemo.org  attracted  “the cloud of not  so serious  developers”  (Ciesielska, 
2010) and remained mostly a support website for users of Nokia devices. From Nokia’s point of 
view it was not a successful undertaking, as it has not managed to provide a set of high-quality 
applications for Nokia’s mobile phones. Many Maemo.org contributors felt the same way. One of 
the Nokia engineers also commented that Nokia:
have not seen anything really useful come out of that exercise ever there are some  
tools that would have been developed anyway completely without having this sort of  
community there.
Level 5: Companies participating in OSS projects led by the community
At the  same time  as  launching  Maemo,  Nokia  was  collaborating  on  other  projects  led  by the 
communities. One of them was GNOME – the free desktop project.  The GNOME community is 
primarily focused on software development and attracts  a wide group of contributors, including 
many bigger and smaller companies,  like Red Hat,  Google,  IBM, Motorola,  Oracle,  Collabora, 
Igalia, SUSE, Code Think, Free Software Foundation, Mozilla Foundation, and many independent 
software developers. Although Nokia eventually became the sponsor of the GNOME Foundation, it 
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has never been able to gain control of the project  and therefore had to participate,  benefit  and 
contribute as any other member (Ciesielska, 2010; 2012). 
From 2005 Nokia was open about its interest in the GNOME code repository, although they had 
been working on GStreamer-related technologies much earlier than that. In this initial stage they 
were  purely  a  ‘community  customer’  with  no  contributions  (Level  2  involvement).  Soon  they 
realized that this strategy had a serious flaw - it created a code fork, which prevented them from 
taking full advantage of the OSS development process. This problem was related to the fact that a 
complex system like software is very sensitive to changes and sub-optimizations. In other words, a 
small change may have tremendous consequences on how the software works (or stops working). 
Since summer 2005 Nokia tried to fix this by aligning its version of the code repository with the  
official GNOME one. It took them about two years to catch up (Ciesielska, 2010; 2012).
Soon after, Nokia became a cornerstone sponsor of the annual GNOME Users’ And Developers’ 
European  Conference,  where  the  firm  regularly  makes  presentations.  Nokia  also  hired  OSS 
engineers  and  subcontractors  chosen  among  the  original  GNOME/GTK+  developers,  who  for 
several years became involved in the Maemo project. The first task was to reintegrate Nokia’s with 
GNOME’s  code.  This  was  quite  difficult  and required  not  only technical  knowledge,  but  also 
strategic decision making of what was appropriate for submission to the upstream. Later on, one of 
the Nokia OSS engineers declared that in order to simplify the technical process, Nokia tried to 
integrate with the upstream wherever possible:
So we do the design and [use] open source instead of sit down and write it ourselves. We  
send the patches to an open mailing list, get reviews and feedback […] and when it’s done,  
it’s merged up with upstream and then we can pull it back from there. So, in a way, rather  
than doing it within Nokia and pushing it out, it sort of comes back through open source,  
which is nice.
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At the same time the expectations and needs of the open source community were growing, beyond 
what Nokia was offering. The basic difference between Nokia’s approach to GNOME and a truly 
OSS-originated company was the lack of any altruistic element. Despite engineers’ declarations and 
good intentions, truly open collaboration was not exactly in line with the overall corporate logic. A 
lot of formal and informal internal rules restricted actual OSS contributions. The protection of a 
possible  competitive  advantage  was  the  most  significant  factor  that  created  problems.  The 
competitive advantage rule stated that any piece of code that is not a simple fix or bug report, but 
presents a solution never implemented before, represents Nokia’s competitive advantage and is an 
internal knowledge asset. This affected, in particular, GNOME Nokia contributors whose code was 
taking a long time reaching upstream, and some not at all. A Nokia employee commented on this:
The problem is that quite often the things we are asked to do are either patented or what they  
call ‘a competitive advantage’. So then they don’t really want that to be shared because it is  
an advantage.
If Nokia open sourced anything, it was because it was better for Nokia’s development process, not 
necessarily for the good of anyone else. Therefore over a couple of years Nokia managed to create a 
highly negative impression of a company which took more than it gave. At the same time Nokia 
kept parts of the Maemo operating system as a closed component2 (Ciesielska, 2012). 
The initial GNOME excitement turned into distrust. In the meantime, Nokia managed to lose its 
GNOME/GTK team – the majority of which resigned in 2008 due to job burnout. But the turning 
point  in  Nokia-GNOME relations  was in  June 2008, when they announced their  acquisition  of 
Trolltech, their Qt application development framework – a competitive solution to GNOME/GTK+ 
package. The next decision was to replace GNOME/GTK+ with Nokia-owned Qt. Most GNOME 
contributors couldn’t hide their dissatisfaction with Nokia’s decision and found it very insulting that 
2 Similarity to Level 3 of involvement – mixing open and proprietary solutions
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Nokia  advertised  Qt  jobs  at  their  conference,  showing no respect  for  how much  the  GNOME 
community had worked to make GTK+ a useful tool (Ciesielska, 2010).
Abandoning GNOME without any warning proved that Nokia had a lack of respect for OSS work 
and achievements and fuelled even more distrust towards the company. What Nokia did not realize 
for many years, was the importance of trust within open source software projects. As a result, Nokia 
started to be perceived as located at the opposite end of the scale to companies like Red Hat, which 
were considered truly open source, very much immersed in the open source logic. Nokia’s agenda, 
on the other hand, was unclear and changeable,  because it has never been able to transform its 
strategy from closed to open software development (Ciesielska and Iskoujina, 2012). 
Level 6: Companies becoming members of open source software communities
This  last  level  illustrates  the  highest  degree  of  company  involvement.  This  level  is  not  well 
described in the literature. We use the case of TYPO3 to illustrate this level (Westenholz, 2012).
TYPO3 is a content management system created by a young Dane - Kasper Skaarhøj - in the late 
1990’s. During 1½ year he devoted most of his time developing the software, which he released in 
2000 on a GPL license3. After it was released a network of very diverse actors established itself 
around the product, which grew to thousands over the years. Some are private users of TYPO3. 
Others are employed  in companies  and use the software to develop a homepage for their  own 
company/organization. A third group are freelancers and web bureaus selling services connected to 
the implementation of TYPO3. The customers don’t pay for the software, which is released within 
the community but they pay for the specific applications and services requested by them from the 
company. These groups are primarily users of TYPO3, but many also take part in its development 
by identifying errors/bugs and developing extensions, specifically directed at the customer’s needs. 
The core development of TYPO3 is a fourth group comprising relatively few people. They also 
3 Why he did not establish a business is another story – not told here.
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evaluate and incorporate the suggestions they deem useful into the official version of the program. 
Almost  all  of  them are  freelancers  loosely  affiliated  with  a  web  bureau.  The  official  TYPO3 
Association was created in 2004 as a non-profit organization, and was founded to provide funds for 
long-term development goals that would not be possible otherwise. Since it started, the association 
has attracted about 600 members,  companies and freelancers  alike.  The funds are generated by 
membership fees and donations. 
Companies play an important role within the TYPO3 community. Compared with non-commercial 
TYPO3 actors, the ‘commercial’ TYPO3 actors  devote more man-hours on developing TYPO3: 
they interact more frequently with others about the software, they participate in social community 
events and to a higher degree, consider themselves to be part of the TYPO3 community on a local,  
national, and international level. They also feel more known in the community and often think that 
one should pay attention to the proper socialization into the community. The conclusion does not 
mean  that  TYPO3  can  be  understood  as  a  community  of  commercial  actors  alone.  The  non-
commercial contributors also take part in the network around TYPO3, but the commercial ones play 
a central role in this network.
The diversity of actors as well as a clear business model emerging around this community allowed 
for a hybridization of technological,  economic and social  logics.  The following citation from a 
managing director and programmer can illustrate this:  
We  have  done  a  lot  of  work  for  TYPO3.  What  we  develop,  we  like  to  share  with  
others...what we do, others enjoy and we don’t think that we lose anything by publishing it.  
We still have the expertise and know-how when it comes to the new system... we earn our  
money by getting something that other people have developed. So in this way, we enter  
some kind of community where we draw on [the work of] a large number of other people,  
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and then we give back to the community as best we can. In our case, it is not just financial,  
but more about investing our time and publishing some of what we have created.
Firms participate  in the development  of TYPO3 software in many different  ways.  Some firms, 
developing software for specific customers, release their new knowledge to the TYPO3 community. 
Some software developers, employed in a TYPO3 company, contribute to the development of the 
core TYPO3 software on a voluntary basis, together with volunteer programmers and programmers 
from other companies.  Some of them also contribute outside of their  usual  work time.  Several 
companies,  working  together  to  develop  specific  elements  of  the  software,  release  knowledge 
directly to the community, and many firms, which primarily develop TYPO3 software internally, 
also share their code with the community (Westenholz, 2012).
Not all companies contribute back everything they have created. It happens in particular when their 
customers have paid for development of specific knowledge and do not want it to be public or when 
knowledge is so customer-made that it is of no interest to the community. However this type of non-
sharing behavior is accepted in the community. But sometimes the companies get into dilemmas 
between the different logics. It may happen if they have spent a lot of time in developing knowledge 
and they want to increase their profit by non-sharing behavior. On the other hand they know that 
technical advantages are achieved if the knowledge is shared and they may also get sanctioned by 
the community if they are defined as free-riders.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions
As showed in the example cases, there are (at least!) six levels of business involvement in the open 
source field. Now, we will discuss those empirically observed levels in the context of the existing 
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literature and conclude with key dilemmas commercial  firms may face if they decide to adopt the 
open source logic.
The  lowest  degree  of  contact  is  where  companies  imitate/translate  ideas  from  open  source 
(duplicate incentives, knowledge-sharing within the firm, user-involvement),  but are not directly 
involved  with  the  communities.  Level  1  companies  simply  imitate  the  open  source  way  of 
developing software but  maintain it within a clearly controlled environment. In the literature this 
new way of boosting creativity in business is covered under the term ‘open innovation’. However, 
in this case the whole process of innovation is not truly open, but only those elements that are 
beneficial  for  the  company,  and the  exchange  is  often  one  way (the  ‘outside-in’  part  of  open 
innovation),  for example using existing or potential  customers to suggest improvements. On the 
contrary,  inside-out  open innovation  requires  organizations  to  allow ideas  to  go  outside  to  the 
market, but these cases are rarer, less research reports them and they seem to be less understood by 
business (Chesbrough, 2012). 
The next step sees companies becoming ‘community customers’ as they use open source software 
and  sometimes  support  the  community  financially.  Level  2  companies  acknowledge  the  value 
created in the open source area, but benefit from it directly, integrating or simply using OSS in their  
businesses4.  ‘Community customers’  to a large extent  are one-side beneficiaries,  but some may 
donate or support OSS projects in a minor way.
Real involvement  in the development  of open source software happens in the third step, where 
companies  sell  their  combination  of proprietary software and open source software.  Firms may 
deliberately try to marry multiple software modules with clear distinctions as to which are open and 
which should be keep proprietary.  There are two potential ways of mixing  software development 
4 The examples of commonly used Open Source software includes: Linux Operating System, FireFox Browser, Mozilla 
Browser, Apache Web server, Perl programming language, OpenOffice Suite, and MySQL Database.
19
solutions. Companies can either be based on open software, but allow closed-source extensions or 
despite  a  proprietary  core,  allow  for  open  source  extensions  (Casadesus-Masanell  and  Llanes, 
2011)5. 
In the fourth step, companies release codes and try to build an open source software community 
around the project. In most cases the company has a clear lead and/or control over the project, 
which contributions to accept or reject and which developers to support. The OSS project serves as 
a  supplementary  or  sole  R&D  project  with  clear  links  to  the  company’s  primary  business 
(Ciesielska, 2010). 
The fifth step is characterized by firms which participate in open source software developments lead 
by an independent community. In this case the firm acts as co-developer and potentially financial 
supporter, but has relatively little say in terms of project management. 
The  last  step,  which  illustrates  the  highest  degree  of  involvement,  is  characterized  by  firms 
becoming members of open source software communities: firm employees write code, support the 
community and participate in its management. This level is not well researched in the literature. 
The three lower levels of involvement are fairly well described by the literature,  especially  that 
which focuses on strategy, innovation, R&D. In all cases the primary companies’ logics reside in 
the economic spectrum, with elements of technology-related structures. Levels 1 and 2 do not pose 
much  difficulty  for  commercial  organizations.  Both  of  those  levels  are  embedded  in  business 
activities, with a clear agenda of one-sided benefits from the open source software or ideas behind 
it.  Level  1  firms  may  capture  innovation  spill-outs  from  other  technology  areas.  Their  main 
dilemma is the choice between absolute autonomy at the expense of potential innovation or relying 
on external contributions to expand their creative potential. Level 2 firms benefit simply by using 
5 The examples of the former, ‘Open Core’ solutions are SugarCRM, Zimbra, JasperSoft, Mac OS X, while MSFT Net, 
Mathematica, Stata, Facebook fall in the latter ‘Open Edge’ category.
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open source software instead of purchasing a proprietary solution. The choice between waiting for 
others to innovate ”for free” versus buying innovation seems to be the key dilemma here. None of 
the choices are obviously better at providing more advanced solutions. Although the open source 
solutions are perceived as cheaper, the initial cost savings may be spent later on maintenance and 
other adaptations. Level 3 firms can employ either purely commercial or technological logics. In 
both  cases  they  remain  consistent  in  their  talks  and actions.  Commercially-focused ones  see a 
business opportunity in  mixing open and closed source software,  while  technology-driven ones 
would aim at allowing open source software to be combined or compatible with the proprietary 
components.
Insert Table 2 about here
Firms with  higher  levels  of  involvement  (4 to  6  on our  scale)  find  themselves  in  much  more 
complicated situations. This primarily comes from the fact that at those stages firms face hard to 
commensurate logics of action and various stakeholder pressures. Level 4 and 5 firms are guided 
primarily by economic and technological logics, but within social structures created by open source 
software communities. As a result the commercial actors need to develop and keep successful trust 
relationship  with  voluntary  and  business  partners  in  order  to  secure  valued  and  continuous 
contributions.  While companies leading open source projects (level 4) are the primary beneficiary, 
companies  participating  in  open  source  projects  lead  by  an  open  source  community  are  the 
secondary ones (level 5), with the community interest taking the first place. In both cases the main 
dilemma  for  the  commercial  actors  is  how  to  balance  autonomy  and  the  value  generated  by 
collaboration. Also, the movement from Level 4 to Level 5 means shifting the main beneficiary 
from the company to the community. Level 5 firms are in a difficult position where they have little 
control over the open source software communities’ directions, while on Level 6 there is a high risk 
of providing competitors with free knowledge. As a result businesses becoming involved in open 
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source at Level 5 and 6 become vulnerable, unless they adjust their strategies and reformulate value 
propositions  to  accommodate  the  fact  that  the  work they  do in  the  open is  easily  available  to 
anyone. Failing to do so result in luck of trust and legitimacy, and may lead, as in the case of Nokia, 
to project closure (Ciesielska, 2010; 2012). 
Alternatively, if companies succeed in building trust and legitimacy they become involved in fast-
paced  innovative  processes,  which  they  would  not  have  been  able  to  create  on  their  own. 
Furthermore software engineers actually consider their work to be fun (Hunter et al., 2010) and the 
involvement  in  open  source  may  become  of  personal  importance  and  a  career  progression 
opportunity. This will create a strong pro-open source coalition inside the organization. This strong 
cultural  basis  combined with a  balance  between exploration  and exploitation  of  knowledge are 
considered  to  be  potential  success  factors  (Hemetsberger  and  Reinhardt,  2006).  TYPO3  is  an 
excellent  example  of  how  combining  commercial  and  community  interest  lead  to  advanced 
technological innovation and sustainable business (Westenholz, 2012).
Theoretically our  study  contributes  to  the  growing  literature  within  institutional  organizational 
theory focusing on different organizational responses to pluralistic, widespread institutional field
logics (Boxenbaum 2006; Feldman 2003;  Oliver, 1991;  Reay and Hinings, 2009;  Tilcsik,  2010; 
Westenholz, 2012). As mentioned in the introduction software development used to be developed 
within either an organizational field of companies applying an institutional logic of  ‘copyright’, or 
an organizational field of open source communities applying an institutional logic of ‘copyleft’. 
Since  the  middle  of  the  1990s firms  have  begun  to  get  involved  in  open  source  software 
development  and our  contribution  is  to  show how software  companies  have  responded to  this 
development in six different ways. We also show that they are facing different types of dilemmas 
according to their responses. 
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Finally,  we would  like  to  mention  some  ideas  for  future  research.  In  the  paper  we identify  6 
graduations  of  involvement.  However  the  number  of  cases,  and  their  timescale,  limit  the 
generalizability  of our analysis.   A more systematic  taxonomy may show new global  trends  in 
commercial open source software solutions. One may also develop a new taxonomy by combining 
the work by Grand et al. (2004) focusing on four levels of companies’ resource allocation and our 
work focusing on six degrees of companies’ involvement with open source software communities. 
Further  empirical  studies  may  reveal  even  more  graduations  or combinations  of  graduations. 
Obtaining empirical examples of successes and failures at each of the levels so a more extensive 
comparison  could  be  made  would  be  worthwhile.  Finally  it  would  be  interesting  to  study the 
dynamics between the graduations to understand how companies move from one level to another. 
The  exact  patterns  are  yet  to  be  uncovered  and  properly  theorized.  Empirical  evidence  is  not 
coherent  in  this  matter  and  does  not  support  a  single  movement  throughout  the  scale.  Some 
organizations  are  operating  at  different  levels,  using  differentiated  strategies  (Ciesielska,  2010; 
2012). Other companies may regress in their open strategies due to difficulty in managing the open-
closed dilemma (Ciesielska, 2010, Ciesielska and Iskoujina, 2012). Yet other businesses are more 
static,  like  the  ones  created  within  an  OSS  paradigm  offering  business  support  and  bespoke 
solutions based on open source software (Westenholz, 2012; Ciesielska and Petersen, 2013). 
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Figure 1: Firms’ involvement in Open Source Software Communities
(Westenholz, 2012, p.28)
.
1. Companies imitating and translating ideas from open 
source communities (duplicating incentives, knowledge-
sharing within the firm, user-involvement).
2. Companies as: ’community customers’ using the open 
source software and sometimes also supporting the 
community with money.
3. Companies combining proprietary software with open 
source software.
4. Companies leading open source software projects 
(managing the project, creating codes, supporting the 
project).
5. Companies participating in open source software projects 
led by a community (creating codes, supporting the 
project).
6. Companies becoming members of open source software 
communities (creating codes, supporting the community, 
co-managing the community).
Low degree
High degree
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Table 2: Six levels of firms’ involvement in open source software communities
Level 1: 
Firm 
imitatin
g or 
translati
ng ideas 
from 
open 
source 
commun
ity
Level 2: 
Firm in 
the role 
of open 
source 
commun
ity 
‘custom
ers’
Level 3: 
Firm 
combini
ng 
propriet
ary and 
open 
source 
software
Level 4: 
Firm 
leading 
open 
source 
project
Level 5: 
Firm 
participa
ting in 
open 
source 
project 
led by an 
open 
source 
communi
ty
Level 6: 
Firm 
becomin
g 
member 
of open 
source 
commun
ity
Primary 
firm logic
Economic Economic Economic 
and 
technologic
al
Primarily 
economic 
and 
technologic
al.
Secondary 
social
Primarily 
technologica
l and 
economic.
Secondary 
social
Technologic
al, 
economic 
and social
Firms’ 
type of 
relations
hip with 
open 
source 
communi
ties
Borrowing 
ideas from 
open 
source 
developme
nt
Becoming a 
user of 
open 
source 
software
Developing 
a fit 
between 
proprietary 
and open 
source 
software
Financial 
and fully 
hosting an 
open 
source 
project
Co-
developer in 
the project 
and financial 
supporting 
the 
community 
Co-leader, 
co-
developer, 
and 
financial 
supporting 
the 
community
Key 
actors
Company Company Company Company 
as leader 
and open 
source 
community 
members 
as 
followers 
Open source 
community 
as leader 
and 
company as 
follower
Voluntary 
developers 
and 
companies 
as 
members 
within the 
community
Firms’ 
regulativ
e license
Copyright Copyright Copyright 
and 
copyleft
Copyright 
and 
copyleft
Copyright 
and copyleft
Copyleft
34
Who is 
benefitti
ng from 
the open 
source 
software 
developm
ent
The 
company is 
not 
benefitting 
from the 
open 
source 
software, 
but may 
capture 
innovation 
spill outs 
from other 
technology 
areas.
The 
company is 
benefitting 
by using 
open 
source 
software 
internally in 
the 
company
The 
company is 
enriching 
its own 
proprietary 
software by 
adding 
open 
source 
software
The 
company is 
the 
primary 
beneficiary
. 
The 
followers in 
the open 
source 
community 
are 
secondary 
beneficiari
es
The open 
source 
community 
is the 
primary 
beneficiary.
The 
company as 
a follower is 
secondary 
beneficiary
Companies, 
customers 
and 
voluntary 
developers 
are all 
primary 
beneficiarie
s
Firm 
dilemma
Autonomy 
at the 
expense of 
potential 
innovation 
Waiting for 
others to 
innovate 
versus 
buying 
innovation 
Waiting for 
others to 
innovate 
versus 
internal 
innovation
Autonomy 
versus 
cooperatio
n
Cooperation 
versus 
autonomy
Cooperatio
n versus 
free-riding
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